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With Georgia forced to survive one of the most frigid winters in years with an 
intermittent supply of energy, the impending need to diversify energy sources has 
reached a new level of urgency.  After the pipeline explosion in the Northern Caucasus 
left Georgia with an increased sense of vulnerability, the frustration of being held hostage 
to the whims of a single energy partner has renewed the government’s efforts to achieve 
energy independence.  Yet the quest for new energy partners is not one without obstacles.  
The issue of finding partners that are both reliable and practical in a region with 
numerous myopic governments will undoubtedly prove to be a difficult task.  However, 
one thing that is clear is that if the Georgian government remains complacent with 
regards to ensuring its own energy security, it will run the risk of becoming just another 
chapter of the Kremlin’s efforts to monopolize the energy market in its near abroad.  For 
the sake of its national security and its sovereignty, it is therefore incumbent upon the 
Georgian government to effectively diversify energy supplies in the very near future. 
 
Given its geo-strategic location amidst several oil-rich countries, there are several options 
for Georgia’s energy diversification.  Having already turned to Iran during its energy 
crisis last month, Georgia’s oil rich southern neighbor has vast gas and oil reserves that 
are just waiting to be purchased.  With the pipeline infrastructure already linking the two 
markets, the opportunity for Georgia to enter into short or long term agreements with Iran 
is certainly appealing.   
 
Georgia’s close proximity to the Caspian Sea also affords it the possibility to import 
energy from the countries of Central Asia.  The endless potential for high levels of gas to 
be exported from Turkmenistan should not be overlooked by the Georgian government.  
With experts predicting that gas exports could exceed 100 billion cubic meters per year 
before the end of the decade, there can be no doubt that Turkmenistan is destined to 
become a major player in the world energy market once the transportation infrastructure 
is built. 
 
With one of the world’s largest oil fields recently discovered on its territory, Kazakhstan 
remains an additional option for diversification.  It has been predicted that by 2020 
Kazakhstan could be exporting fuel to world markets that will equal or exceed that of 
Saudi Arabia, today’s most abundant supplier of oil1.  As was the case with 
Turkmenistan, the issue for Georgia is not whether the supply will run out, but rather the 
means by which the oil will be transported to the South Caucasus region. 
 
Finally, the prospect of strengthening ties with Azerbaijan presents the Georgian 
government with an oil-rich partner that also just happens to be one of its neighbors.  The 
recent construction of the BTC pipeline coupled with the imminent completion of the 
Shah-Deniz pipeline has already provided a basis for a strong energy partnership with the 
Azeri government.  The bonds of this new relationship were put to the test with the 
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explosion of the North Causcasus pipeline last month as a majority of Georgia’s 
emergency supply was channeled via Azerbaijani pipelines.  Having proved that the 
Azerbaijani’s are reliable energy partners, the issue now for Georgia is finding a way to 
expand and deepen this partnership.    
 
Thus Georgia is presented with several options to consider as it hastens its search for new 
sources of energy.  Despite the fact that the region is vast in oil and gas supplies, the 
politics surrounding the opportunity, or lack thereof, to enter into short or long term 
agreements are by no means simple.  Let us therefore take into consideration the 
practicality of whether the potential partners listed above could present real concrete 
options for the Georgian government.   
 
Though Iran temporarily came to Georgia’s aid in order to help ease the most recent 
energy crisis, Tehran wasted no time in exploiting Georgia’s vulnerable and desperate 
position.  Forced to pay nearly double the price for Iranian gas than they were paying for 
Russian gas, the Saakashvili government should be wary of entering into any kind of an 
agreement with a partner that is willing to employ such merciless tactics.  Additionally, 
international sentiments towards Iran are nowhere near friendly at the moment given the 
issue of nuclear fuel development.  Should it decide to invest in Iranian energy, Georgia 
risks losing the respect of the international community amidst its drive for membership 
into Euro-Atlantic organizations, as well as financial assistance from the United States 
under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA).  Although there is a certain degree of 
understanding from the international community when it comes to buying Iranian gas for 
the purpose of easing a humanitarian crisis, there is little sympathy when it comes to 
reshaping ones political and financial alliances.  An energy partnership with Iran is 
therefore decidedly impractical and does not present a viable option for the Georgian 
government. 
 
Whereas the greatest issue with Iran is politics, the main issue hovering over increased 
cooperation with Kazakhstan is transportation.  As the situation stands right now, any 
pipeline that is transporting gas or oil from Kazakhstan must pass through Russian 
territory.  Having already experienced the ruthlessness with which Russian energy 
companies operate, it brings little comfort to the minds of Georgian policy makers to 
know that Gazprom and Transneft, the Kremlin dominated gas and oil companies, 
respectively, are in possession of nearly all pipelines crossing Russian territory.  The 
recent illegal decision from the Kremlin to prohibit the flow of Kazakh oil to Lithuania 
via Russian pipes is just one of many searing examples exposing the problems with 
transporting energy from this region2.  A potential breath of fresh air could come, 
however, if a seabed pipeline is constructed to transport hydrocarbons from the Kashagan 
oilfield in Kazakhstan to link up with Baku.  Yet any agreement in the near future is 
unlikely to evade pressure from Kazakhstan’s mighty northern neighbor to direct the 
pipeline instead through Russian territory.   
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With regards to Turkmenistan, the issue is much the same.  Another country under heavy 
influence from Moscow, Turkmenistan has already received warnings that all of its gas 
supplies will come to a complete halt if it decides to construct a seabed pipeline that 
would transport oil to Western markets rather than Russian or Iranian ones.  While a 
partnership with the Turkmen government would seriously open up Georgia’s energy 
diversification, the government must first overcome the Russian monopoly on 
transportation routes to all markets west of Central Asia. 
 
At last there lies Georgia’s Azeri neighbor to the east.  Having already come to 
agreements on two pipelines that will run through its territory, the Georgian-Azeri energy 
partnership holds great potential.  While the BTC will only cover a fraction of Georgia’s 
petroleum needs, the Shah-Deniz pipeline will provide Georgia with anywhere from 50 – 
83 percent of its gas needs in transit fees, depending on the final numbers.3  Although 
importing such large quantities of gas from a single partner may be counterproductive to 
the idea of diversification, Azerbaijan’s reliability as an energy supplier was reinforced 
during the most recent crisis in Georgia.  As a direct neighbor, the Georgian government 
would be wise to continue strengthening its political and economic ties with Azerbaijan. 
 
As Georgia aims to cross the bridge from energy dependence to independence, the issue 
of Russia as either a partner or a competitor remains the most deciding factor.  While 
there is no doubt that both Russia and Georgia have varying interests with regards to 
energy policy in the region, there is no reason why these interests cannot coexist.  Despite 
any degree of financial assistance or political leverage from its Western friends, the fact 
remains that Georgia cannot achieve energy independence without at least the tacit 
cooperation of the Russian government.  It is therefore imperative to its own national 
security for Georgia to find ways to improve diplomatic relations with the Kremlin.  In 
the meantime, Georgia should work to open relations with potentially new energy 
partners and develop plans for deepening relations with Azerbaijan.  The necessity to 
establish these links cannot be overstated. 
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